National Tribune.



"To care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphans."

ESTABLISHED 1877.—NEW SERIES. WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1882. VOL. II—NO. 11.—WHOLE NO. 63.

SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

The History of Longstreet's Campaign Against Burnside.

A FLANK ATTACK.

Burnside Retreats from Campbell's Station.

KNOXVILLE ENTRENCHED

Longstreet Follows at a Respectful Distance.

[Continued from last week.]

It was now twelve o'clock, noon, and the attack referred to by Longstreet was immediately begun by McLaws, while Jenkins was executing his flank movement.

McLaws says: "After waiting several hours, for the purpose, as I have understood, of allowing General Jenkins to get into position to make a flank movement upon the enemy's left, I was ordered to form the brigades of Kershaw, Wofford, and Bryan in line of battle across the valley, and move upon the enemy." Bryan's brigade was held in reserve, and the remainder moved forward at once and continued to advance until checked by orders from Longstreet, who desired McLaws's attack to follow that of Jenkins's on the flank. When Potter withdrew to his second position, Humphreys's brigade of McLaws's division, which had up to this time been posted on a hill to the left, advanced along the ridge, his skirmishers exchanging shots with the Union troops on Potter's right. McLaws makes little mention of his repulse at Campbell's Station.

Referring to the flank movement on the left of General Potter's line, Jenkins says: "General Law, being on the right, was ordered to move, followed by Anderson's brigade, far enough along the hills upon the enemy's left to bring the next to the last of Anderson's regiments opposite the enemy's guns, so that not only the guns but their supporting lines might be struck in flank and rear by the two brigades. Benning was ordered to cover the right flank of the attacking line with his brigade, withdrawing Jenkins's brigade (commanded by Colonel Bratton) by a flank movement from the open field in the front of the enemy into the woods. I directed the primary movements of the other brigades to be made with the utmost promptitude. The hills and ground over which our column was required to pass was very difficult, being covered with a close undergrowth of scraggy oaks, and the distance having been increased by the enemy's front lines retiring under the fire of our artillery, it required considerable time to attain the desired position upon their flank, their lines having open ground to retire upon, and being able to move at least as fast as our columns. Hastening the movements, however, about the time Bratton's brigade reported, Law reported himself in the directed position, and I ordered Anderson immediately to the attack. Upon reaching Law's brigade, I found he had not gone far enough to the right to put Anderson in position, but his own brigade, by advancing, could strike the battery and enemy's flank. Sending to stop Anderson, I directed in person General Law to make the attack with his brigade, independently of Anderson. Having received my assurance of support and protection to his flanks, he commenced his advance, and the other brigades were promptly placed to support and follow the attack. In a few minutes, greatly to my surprise, I received a message from General Law that, in advancing, his brigade had obliqued so much to the left as to have gotten out of its line of attack. This causeless and inexcusable movement lost us the few moments in which success from this point could be obtained."

A feeble attempt to gain the rear of Potter followed, but was prevented by a vigorous attack by Hartranft. While this movement had been progressing McLaws had made an equally futile effort against the centre.

GOOD CONDUCT OF THE NINTH CORPS.

Ferrero says: "The enemy attacked our lines in force with infantry and artillery, but were repulsed at every point. Never did troops manœuvre so beautifully and with such precision as during this engagement; changing positions several times under a severe fire, it seemed more like a drill for field movements than otherwise; brigades moving forward to relieve each other, others retiring, having exhausted their ammunition; changes of front, passing of defiles, were executed by men and officers, so as to draw forth exclamations of the highest praise by those who were so fortunate as to behold their movements. The losses up to this time were quite heavy in my command, including the engagement at the forks of the road, but the enemy must have suffered very severely, as they advanced their lines against a murderous fire from our forces, compelling them to fall back, which must have told effectually upon their lines. They did not attempt to advance again, but contented themselves with shelling our position and endeavoring to flank us with part of their infantry."

Colonel Chapin is equally pleased with the performance of his men. He says: "At 12 o'clock m. we opened fire from the batteries and drove back the enemy, who were advancing in three lines. My whole brigade was now engaged. Some demonstrations were made to flank us, but detachments of the Ninth Corps were thrown on our right and left. After the engagement had lasted some time and our batteries had about exhausted their ammunition, the enemy brought three heavy batteries to bear on ours and I was obliged to order the batteries to the rear, the infantry still remaining and holding the line, although the enemy's fire from both artillery and infantry was very severe. About 3 o'clock I was ordered to cover the retreat of the Ninth Corps, which we did by stretching a line of skirmishers across the entire field and moving my brigade in line of battle slowly to the rear, occasionally halting and checking the enemy. During this movement the fire from the enemy's artillery and infantry was very heavy, but the movement was performed deliberately and steadily,—as though the regiments were on drill,—falling back slowly until we reached the ridge we were ordered to hold. Here we halted, took up position, and again a portion of the Ninth Corps assisted us. This position we held until dark, when the Ninth Corps was withdrawn, and for a short time we were alone in the field. As the Ninth Corps left the field the enemy charged on our left flank, but were handsomely repulsed by the One Hundred and Seventh Illinois. Shortly after this we were ordered off the field to bring up the rear on the road to Knoxville, where we arrived at daybreak next morning."

CHAPIN'S GALLANT BRIGADE.

Colonel Chapin closes his report with a glowing tribute to the gallantry of Colonel W. E. Hobson, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan, and Major Estes, and their regiment, the Thirteenth Kentucky; Colonel Lowry and Major Brooks, and the One Hundred and Seventh Illinois. Colonel Kelly, of the latter, whose resignation had reached him several days before, declined to leave the field, but remained, animating his men by voice and example. Major Sherwood, of the One Hundred and Eleventh Ohio, and Major Wheeler, of the Twenty-third Michigan, with their regiments, receive high praise for their gallantry and soldier-like conduct on this occasion, as well as the officers and soldiers of Henshaw's Illinois and the Twenty-fourth Indiana batteries.

Colonel Chapin gives a list of killed, wounded and missing in the two days in which his brigade was engaged, which foots up fourteen killed, ninety-six wounded, and sixty-six captured and missing.

In withdrawing from Lenoir's at dawn of day one company of the One Hundred and Eleventh Ohio, of Chapin's brigade, on picket, were left in position and captured by Jenkins's division.

The movement on Potter's left was discovered, before Jenkins had an opportunity to make a demonstration on his flank, by a detachment of the One Hundred and Twelfth mounted infantry sent out to reconnoitre on the Concord road. General Burnside, being present upon the field, about 4 p. m., ordered the entire line to be withdrawn to a more favorable position. Hartranft had scarcely formed his line and thrown out his skirmishers on the left when he received a fire from his left flank and rear. He at once changed front with his left, throwing some skirmishers into the woods. At this moment Jenkins was moving through the woods, and was reported to be getting a battery into position on a high hill commanding Hartranft's position. Simultaneously Law's brigade came in sight moving across the cleared ground on Hartranft's left.

BURNSIDE RETIRES TO KNOXVILLE.

Potter says: "Roemer, who was just getting his battery into position, changed front to the left and opened a hot fire upon them. They immediately fell back precipitately and in confusion, and were followed by their skirmishers, who ran out of the woods to our left. The enemy's infantry now seemed to have come to a halt and made no further aggressive movement. Their batteries, however, kept up a hot fire until sundown."

Just before sunset General Burnside ordered Potter to retire to Knoxville. Sending Ferrero forward, followed by the artillery and wagons with Hartranft next, and sending Biddle and a section of United States artillery, under Lieutenant Bartlett, to report to General White, who had orders to cover the rear, the field was vacated about 6 o'clock, and at daybreak next morning the entire command was safely within the works at Knoxville.

Referring to the engagment at Campbell's Station, General Burnside says: "Great credit is due the officers and men for the gallantry and coolness shown on this occasion. The entire command consisted of little over 5,000 men, while the enemy's force was at least double that number. Our loss in killed, wounded and missing was about 300, and that of the enemy must have been very severe, as he was the attacking force."

The withdrawal of a force of 6,000 men from the presence of one of double its numbers, commanded by an officer of such distinguished ability as General Longstreet, may well rank as one of the most skillful of General Burnside's military achievements.

BLUNDERS OF THE CONFEDERATES.

On the part of the confederates a series of blunders, commencing with the detachment of Wheeler on the 13th, continued by the separation of the divisions of McLaws and Jenkins after having crossed the Holston, culminated in a repulse at Campbell's Station. A rapid movement upon Knoxville, covered by a cloud of cavalry, would have cut off Potter and White at Lenoir's, and left an easy passage for Longstreet into the capital of East Tennessee.

Deceived by the report of Burnside's strength, given him by General Stevenson, Longstreet, instead of acting as if he had a force of 20,000, as he claims to have done, moved with the caution of a commander of an inferior force invading territory defended by a force vastly superior to his own.

The golden opportunity to crush one-half of Burnside's available troops was offered him after Potter fell back to Lenoir's, but, instead of moving rapidly to Campbell's Station, McLaws occupied the whole of the 14th in marching fifteen miles, while Jenkins moved thirteen miles to his right, with no other effect than to march to Campbell's Station in the wake of Potter's retreating army.

Either wing of Longstreet's army was equal in numerical strength to his antagonist,—both failed in getting in his rear. When finally concentrated, hesitation to attack enabled Potter to gain possession of the Knoxville road, which he availed himself of as soon as his trains had passed Campbell's Station. The battle for the possession of East Tennessee was fought at Campbell's Station, and decided in favor of the Union troops. No opportunity was again offered the confederate commander to fight on open ground, and the blundering tactics that marked the opening of the campaign forms its most conspicuous feature at its close.

The failure of General Longstreet to cut off the retreat of General Burnside's advanced troops from Lenoir to Knoxville changed the entire character of the expedition. Intended as a diversion upon one flank of the Union armies, it became an independent campaign. From a sudden and destructive blow upon the Army of the Ohio to be delivered by a detachment from the main army, after delivering which it was to return to its position in the line of investment before Chattanooga, the expedition now assumed the character of a campaign under an independent commander.

THE EXPEDITION A FAILURE.

In the light of subsequent events no movement could have been more ill-advised. From his post of observation on Missionary Ridge, General Bragg had seen the Union lines gradually widening, until the confederate lines of investment were such only in name. The capture of Brown's Ferry by General Hazen and the defeat of Jenkins by General Geary at Wauhatchie had opened communications with Bridgeport and afforded a short route to the base of supplies. Both Bragg and Longstreet had seen from their perch on Lookout Mountain the long lines of re-enforcements, led by General Hooker, march through Lookout Valley and pitch their tents within supporting distance of the Army of the Cumberland. Both confederate generals had agreed upon the necessity of rapidity of movement, and General Longstreet, impressed with the perilous positon of the main army, with the daily augmenting forces of General Grant encamped "almost in its midst," had urged its withdrawal beyond Chickamauga Creek. Bragg's reply that he "would not be disturbed" had not quieted the apprehensions of his subordinate, who hoped by rapidity in executing the object of the expedition to return to his position before the Union commander would be aware of the absence of so large a portion of the army in his front. Twelve days had now elapsed since his departure from Missionary Ridge and his expedition had thus far been totally barren of results. To return to the main army was the course dictated by every principle of interest in its safety to General Longstreet, and to recall him was equally imperative upon General Bragg. A succoring army was already on its way from the banks of the Mississippi, and its arrival was to be the signal for an assault upon his lines. Longstreet would doubtless have willingly obeyed an order to turn the head of his columns southward after his failure to engage Burnside at Campbell's Station, but no such order was sent him. The blind confidence of General Bragg induced him not only to rely upon the Army of the Tennessee to hold his position, but to add to the expeditionary force by detaching Buckner's division from the main army. As late as the 24th of November, when Sherman was attacking his right and Hooker was moving from Lookout Mountain across Chickamauga Valley upon his left, while the Army of the Cumberland lay in his front, he wrote: "Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose." What would have been the result if Longstreet's 23,000 troops had been in position on the left of his line is a question that will be decided according to the bias of the reader.

LONGSTREET'S ADVANCE ON KNOXVILLE.

The concentration of Burnside's army in Knoxville was evidently a surprise to Longstreet, who had anticipated an attempt on the part of the former to withdraw his army to Cumberland Gap. While the Union troops were marching into the positions to which they had been assigned in defense of Knoxville at daylight on the 17th of November the confederates were rousing from bivouack upon the battle-field fifteen miles in their rear.

Mention has been made of a detachment from Wheeler's cavalry left on the Hiawassee when he made his movement against Wolford at Maryville. This force, which Longstreet calls a brigade, under command of Colonel Hart, now came to the front and took the advance in the leisurely pursuit of Burnside's retreating army to Knoxville.

Longstreet says: "We advanced at daylight, but only came up with the enemy's rear-guard of cavalry. There was more or less skirmishing with this force until our line of skirmishers and advanced battery came under the guns of the enemy's fort at the northwest angle of his line at Knoxville. His line of skirmishers was about 1,000 yards in front of his works. General McLaw's skirmishers engaging those of the enemy, Colonel Hart's brigade of cavalry was ordered over to the Clinton road to drive in the skirmishers of the enemy, and as soon as Jenkins's division came up it was ordered over to that road. Hart's cavalry was sent on to the Tazewell road, so as to *prevent, as far as possible, the escape of the enemy.* I rode over to the Clinton road to make an examination of the country and select some position for Jenkins's division before night. The next day, on riding to General McLaws front, I found that the enemy's pickets occupied the same ground that they held the day before and that his line had been strengthened during the night by making a defence of rails. Colonel Alexander was ordered to use his guns against this defense, and succeeded once or twice in driving the enemy off from some points of it, but our skirmishers did not move up to occupy it and the enemy returned to it."

Meantime the Union troops were working like beavers to construct earthworks that should enable them to resist the assault that all felt would not be long deferred.

DESCRIPTION OF KNOXVILLE.

General Burnside gives the following description of the topography of the country in the vicinity of Knoxville: "The site occupied by the city of Knoxville, which we were to defend, was on a plateau of about one-half mile in width, running parallel to and close to the Holston River. This plateau was intersected by three creeks, 'First,' 'Second,' and 'Third,' giving the position the appearance of separate hills. First Creek separates Knoxville from East Knoxville or Temperance Hill. Second Creek separated the town from College Hill, and Third Creek emptied into the river below our lines. To the north and west of the town the plateau descended gradually to a valley or basin of about one mile in width, beyond which was a second plateau similar to the one first described and of about the same height."

On this ridge northwest of the town, beyond Fort Sanders, and separated from it and the town by the valley above mentioned, the confederate force was stationed with their batteries on prominent points. The valley was almost entirely cleared of timber, and was at every point under the fire of the Union artillery. From the able and exhaustive report of General O. M. Poe, then captain U. S. Engineers, under whose intelligent direction the defenses at Knoxville were constructed, the following description of the works is taken: "The defenses thrown up at first were nothing but mere rifle pits, having a profile four feet wide by two and one-half feet in depth with a parapet of two f[illegible] in height, making the height from the bottom of the trench to the interior crest of the parapet four and one-half feet. Two forts were in a defensible condition, viz., that occupied by Benjamin's battery and the one on Temperance Hill, the work upon them having been done by the engineer battalion. The troops worked all day and night, and by daylight on the morning of the 15th were tolerably well under cover, still the work was continued, the enemy being held at bay on the Kingston road by the cavalry, under General Sanders, and on the Clinton road by Colonel Pennebaker's mounted regiments. The hours in which to work, that the gallant conduct of our cavalry secured us, were worth to us a thousand men each. It is sad that they were bought at such a price as the life of that most gallant, chivalric soldier and noble gentleman, Brigadier-General William Pitt Sanders. I hope I may be pardoned this allusion to the only classmate I had at the siege of Knoxville. General Sanders falling in front of the work occupied by Benjamin's battery, it seemed appropriate that the fort should be named for him."

The death of this heroic soldier, whose adventurous military career was described in THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE of May 6th, cast a gloom over the entire army. General Burnside refers feelingly to the sad event: "The troops worked all day and night of the 17th, and by noon of the 18th they were pretty well covered. During all this time the gallant Sanders with his dismounted cavalry held the enemy in check. Just as I sent out orders to him to withdraw within the lines I received information that he was mortally wounded. He was brought into the city, where he received all possible attention, but he died the next day. The service lost in the death of General Sanders one of the most noble spirits, and we, his comrades, a beloved friend." His faithful aide-de-camp, Major R. E. Lawder, thus describes the

DEATH OF GENERAL SANDERS:

"We were dismounted and formed in line of battle, with instructions to hold our position in front of the unfinished works at Knoxville until withdrawn. About three p. m. there was a furious assault made by Longstreet's infantry upon our left flank, commanded by that brave and intrepid soldier, Colonel C. D. Pennebaker, of the Twenty-seventh Kentucky mounted infantry. General Sanders had up to this time occupied his proper position in rear of his line, where a slight depression in the ground afforded cover from the enemy's sharpshooters, some of whom were in the house now occupied by Mr. Anderson, not more than 400 yards in front of our line. On hearing the rapid firing going on in Colonel Pennebaker's front, General Sanders immediately walked up to the top of the little rise in the ground where Pennebaker was posted, and saw the assault upon that fine brigade and the gallant repulse. The balls from the rifles of the sharpshooters were whizzing through the air close to our heads, and I was well pleased when he turned deliberately (after having satisfied himself that his presence in the front was no longer required) to walk down to his headquarters. Just as he was turning I heard the thud that tells in unmistakle language that some one has been struck. Then I saw General Sanders stagger; I caught him in my arms and eased him to the ground. He told me to leave him there, that he was no further use, and go on; but that was an order I could not obey. Two other officers, one Adjutant Smith, of a Michigan regiment, and another whose name I have forgotten, came to my assistance, and together we carried him to a place of temporary security, and I immediately started in search of an ambula[illegible] On the way towards the city I met Gen[illegible] Burnside and told him of the wound[illegible] rec[illegible] was mortal, for General Sanders had alw[illegible] seen more the confidential friend of Gen[illegible] Burnside than the ordinary staff officer. The General was greatly shocked, and sent a[illegible] orderly at once for an ambulance, when I ret[illegible]rned to the side of the wounded and dying man. In another hour we had him comfortably provided for at the Lamar House, while the surgeons, among whom was Dr. Hatchitt, an old personal friend of his from Kentucky, were doing all that surgical skill could suggest to save the life so dear to us all. It was soon known that the wound was mortal. The ball had entered his side, tearing through the spleen, I believe, and the surgeons shook their heads when we asked if there was any hope.

"I was a young man then, and full of martial ardor. The most attractive object in all the world to me was a brave, handsome, well-dressed officer, mounted on a good horse, going into battle. I have seen many such men since then, but never one who equalled General Sanders. He was in the prime of life, tall, and perfectly proportioned, exceedingly graceful, and courteous to all. He rode his superb steed as if he was part of himself, guiding and controlling him as if by his will. He was brave as Julius Cæsar in battle, but modest in reference to his own part in a fight, giving credit to every one else, reserving none for himself. He was my prince, and I would have followed wherever he chose to lead. This was the feeling throughout his division, although he had only recently assumed command of it. All knew him as the attentive and experienced chief of cavalry, and every soldier knew that his practiced eye detected, and his care supplied, their wants.

"The hour came very soon when the eyes were closed and the manly form was to be laid in the earth. Any one who was present at that solemn funeral never forgot it. It was midnight when a small procession of officers bore the body of their friend to its final resting place. A muffled drum was our only music, and a time was chosen when the soldiers were at their quarters. Silently the procession wended its way through the streets to an old church yard, where, in a corner, a grave had been dug. We lowered the coffin, filled up the grave, and, that a military salute should not be wanting, we fired our pistols over his grave.

"Thus closed a military career that lacked only time and opportunity to develop into grand and brilliant proportions, for it is my deliberate judgment, in which I know General Burnside coincided, that General William P. Sanders would have inscribed his name high upon the roll of famous generals of the war."

Dr. J. G. Hatchitt, medical director, in a letter to the writer, alludes to the death of General Sanders as follows:

"It was the saddest death I ever witnessed in the army. In his delirium before dying he continually thanked God that he was not shot in the back. Such was the confidence the army had in him that General Burnside requested that his death should not be made known, and the surgeons were accordingly urged to keep up the impression that Sanders was living some time after he was dead."

The sketch of the military career of General Sanders, above referred to, closes as follows:

"One of the forts in rear of the position he gave his life to hold was named in his honor. Before it raged one of the fiercest conflicts of the war; but, as if the gallant Kentuckian whose name it bore had imparted a portion of his own daring spirit to its defenders, the flag upon its crest was never lowered to the enemy."

[To be continued.]

An Appreciative Citizen.

[From the Nateck (Mass.) Citizen.]

THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE comes to us this week with a new heading. We never open this excellent paper without wondering how our G. A. R. boys can get along without it. It gives a great fund of information and story for a dollar a year.

A DEED OF DARING.

The True Story of the Capture of a Rebel Railway Train.

VEXATIOUS DELAYS.

How the Wires Were Cut and the Enemy Checkmated.

THE POWDER-TRAIN RUSE.

A Long Run with No Sign of the Foe in the Rear.

[Continued from last week.]

After the fire had been made to burn briskly Andrews jumped off the engine, ran back to the box-car, about the door of which we were standing, and clasped our hands in an ecstasy of congratulation. He declared that all our really hard work was done, and that our difficulties were nearly passed; that we had the enemy at such a disadvantage that he could not harm us; and exhibited every sign of joy. Said he, "Only one train to meet, and then we will put our engine to full speed, burn the bridges that I have marked out, dash through Chattanooga, and on to Mitchel at Huntsville. We've got the upper hand of the rebels now, and they can't help themselves!" How glad we all were! When, three years later, the capture of Richmond set all the bells of the North ringing out peals of triumph, the sensation of joy was more diffused, but less intense than we then experienced. Almost everything mankind values seemed within our grasp. Oh, if we had met but one unscheduled train!

This reference of Andrews to one train which he expected to meet before we began to burn bridges, has been quoted in many public sketches, and has led to some misapprehension. He did expect to meet three trains before reaching Chattanooga; but two of these were regular trains, and, being also further up the road, were not supposed to present any serious difficulty. Their position at any given time could be definitely ascertained, and we could avoid collision with them, no matter how far we ran ahead of time. But so long as there were irregular trains on the road before us, our only safety was in keeping the regular time of the captured train. This was, unfortunately, very slow; but if we exceeded it we lost the right of way, and were liable to a collision at any moment. This risk was greatly increased by our inability to send ahead telegraphic notifications of our position. The order of southward-bound trains, according to the information we then had, was as follows: First, a way freight, which was very uncertain as to time, but which we expected to meet early in the morning, and felt sure that it would be at Kingston or south of that point. This was the only real hindrance, according to our programme, and it was to this train that Andrews referred. Behind this were the regular freight train, and still farther north the regular passenger train. As a matter of fact, we did meet these trains at Adairsville and Calhoun, the latter being somewhat behind time; but we might have met them farther north had it not been for unforseen hindrances.

DISCREPANCIES IN PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS.

There is considerable discrepancy in the many published accounts of the following chase, which the writer has not, in every case, been able to perfectly reconcile. In the intense excitement and novel situations involved, men were not likely to observe or remember every event accurately. But no pains have been spared to combine fullness and completeness in the following account. Using the best of my own recollections, consulting my comrades, reading carefully all published accounts, and especially going over the whole route years after, with Fuller and Murphy, two of the pursuing party, who kindly gave me all the information in their power, it is hoped that substantial accuracy has been obtained. Some of the incidents of the chase, such as the number of times the track was torn up, and whether we were fired upon by pursuing soldiers, allow some room for a conflict of memory. But the variations are not material.

Side by side with the road ran the telegraph wires, which were able, by the flashing of a single lightning message ahead, to arrest our progress and dissipate our fondest hopes. There was no telegraph station where we had captured the train, but we knew not how soon our enemies might reach one, or whether they might not have a portable battery at command. Therefore we ran but a short distance, after replenishing the furnace, before again stopping to cut the wire.

THE TELEGRAPH WIRES CUT.

John Scott, an active young man of the Twenty-first Ohio, scrambled up the pole with the agility of a cat, and tried to break the wire by swinging upon it; but, failing in this, he knocked off the insulating box at the top of the pole and swung with it down to the ground. Fortunately, a small saw was found on the engine, with which the wire was severed in two places, and the included portion, many yards in length, was taken away with us, in order that the ends might not be readily joined.

While one or two of the party were thus engaged, others worked with equal diligence in taking up a rail from the track. No good track-raising instruments had been found on the train, and we had not yet procured them from any other source. A smooth iron bar, about four feet long, was the only instrument yet found, and with this some of the spikes were slowly and painfully battered out. After a few had thus been extracted, a lever was got under the rail and the remainder were pried loose. This occupied much more time than cutting the wire, and it required no prophet to foretell that if we did not procure better tools rail lifting would have to be used very sparingly in our programme. In the present instance, however, the loss of time was no misfortune, as we were ahead of the scheduled time, which we still felt bound to observe.

After another rapid but brief run, we paused long enough to chop down a telegraph pole, cut the wire again, and place the pole, with many other obstructions, on the track. We did not here try to lift a rail; indeed, we had little serious fear of any pursuit at this time, and merely threw on these obstructions because of having spare time to employ.

A POWDER TRAIN FOR REBELS.

We thus continued—running a little ahead of time, then stopping to obstruct the track and cut the wire—until Cass Station was reached, where we took on a good supply of wood and water. At this place we also obtained a complete time schedule of the road. Andrews told the tank-tender that we were running a powder-train through to the army of General Beauregard at Corinth, which was almost out of ammunition, and that the greatest haste was necessary. He further claimed to be a confederate officer of high rank, and said that he had impressed this train for the purpose in hand, and that Fuller, with the regular passenger train, would be along shortly. The whole story was none too plausible, as General Mitchel was now interposed between our present position and Beauregard, and we would never have been able to get a train to the army of the latter on this route; but the tender was not critical, and gave us his schedule, adding that he would willingly send his shirt to Beauregard if that general needed it. When this man was afterwards asked if he did not suspect the character of the enemy he thus aided, he answered that he would as soon have suspected the president of the confederacy himself as one who talked so coolly and confidently as Andrews did!

Keeping exactly on regular time, we proceeded without any striking adventures until Kingston was reached. This place—thirty-two miles from Big Shanty—we regarded as marking the first stage of our journey. Two hours had elapsed since the capture of the train, and hitherto we had been fairly prosperous. No track-lifting instruments had yet been obtained, notwithstanding inquiries for them at several stations. We had secured no inflammable materials for more readily firing the bridges, and the road was not yet clear before us. But, on the other hand, no serious hindrance had yet occurred, and we believed ourselves far ahead of any possible pursuit.

THE FIRST STAGE FINISHED.

But at Kingston we had some grounds for apprehending difficulty. This little town is at the junction of the road to Rome, Ga. Cars and engines were standing on the side track. Here we fully expected to meet our first train, and it would be necessary for us to get the switches properly adjusted before we could pass it to go on our way. When we drew up at the station there was handed to Andrews our first and last communication from the management of the road, in the shape of a telegram, ordering Fuller's train—now ours—to wait at Kingston for the local freight, which was considerably behind time. The order was not very welcome, but we drew out on the side track, and watched eagerly for the train. Many persons gathered around Andrews, who here partly personated the conductor of our train, and showered upon him many curious and somewhat suspicious questions. Ours was an irregular train, but the engine was recognized as Fuller's. The best answers possible were given. A red flag had been placed on our engine, and the announcement was made that Fuller, with another engine, was but a short way behind. The powder story was emphasized, and every means employed to avoid suspicion. Andrews only, and the usual complement of train-hands, were visible, the remainder of the party being tightly shut up in the car, which was designated as containing Beauregard's ammunition. The striking personal appearance of Andrews greatly aided him in carrying through his deception, which was never more difficult than at this station. His commanding presence, and firm but graceful address, marked him as a Southern gentleman—a member of the class from which a great proportion of the rebel officers were drawn. His declarations and orders were, therefore, received with the greater respect on this account. But all these resources were here strained to the utmost.

ANOTHER DELAY.

At length the anxiously-expected local freight train arrived, and took its place on another side track. We were about to start on our way, with the glad consciousness that our greatest obstacle was safely passed, when a red flag was noticed on the hindmost freight car. This elicited immediate inquiry, and we were informed that another very long freight train was just behind, and that we would be obliged to await its arrival also. This was most unfortunate, as we had been already detained at Kingston much longer than was pleasant. There were many disagreeable elements in the situation. A crowd of persons was rapidly assembling. The train from Rome was also nearly due, and though it only came to the station and returned on its own branch, yet it was not agreeable to notice the constant increase of force that our enemies were gaining. If any word from the southward arrived, or if our true character was revealed in any other way, the peril would be imminent. But we trusted that this second delay would be brief. Slowly the minutes passed by. To us, who were shut up in the box-car, it appeared as if they would never be gone. Our soldier comrades on the outside kept in the background as much as possible, remaining at their posts on the engine and the cars, while Andrews occupied attention by complaining of the delay, and declaring that the road ought to be kept clear of freight trains when so much needed for the transportation of army supplies, and when the fate of the whole army of the West might depend upon the celerity with which it received its ammunition. There was plausibility enough in his words to lull suspicion in all minds except that of the old switch-tender of the place, who grumbled out his conviction "that something was wrong with that stylish-looking fellow, who ordered everybody around as if the whole road belonged to him." But no one paid attention to this man's complaints, and not many minutes after a distant whistle sounded from the northward, and we felt that the crisis had passed. As there was no more room on the side track, Andrews ordered the switch-tender to let this train run by on the main track. That worthy was still grumbling, but he reluctantly obeyed, and the long succession of cars soon glided by us.

HOPE AGAIN DEFERRED.

This meant release from a suspense more intolerable than the most perilous action. To calmly wait where we could do nothing, while our destiny was being wrought out by forces operating in the darkness, was a terrible trial of nerve. But it was well borne. Brown, Knight, and Wilson, who were exposed to view, exhibited no more impatience than was to be expected of men in their assumed situation. Those of us in the box-car talked in whispers only, and examined the priming of our pistols. We understood that we were waiting for a delayed train, and well knew the